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Abstract
Climate change is considered by policymakers as one of the most pressing global issues of our time. International insti-
tutions and national governments are, to varying degrees, committed to tackling climate change, but it has only been
possible to define a shared system of collective goals across countries through the 2015 United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Paris (COP21). A growing interest in climate change policy has been present in the Italian political debate,
yet we have little evidence regarding the nature of related climate change debates across Italian policymakers. By using
discourse network analysis (DNA) to investigate Italian policymakers’ discourses in the Chamber of Deputies during the
17th Italian Legislature (2013–2018), this study shows that debates on climate change-related strategies are largely un-
polarized, except for certain issues, and that coalitions emerge over time around core strategies. Groups of policymakers
with similar policy beliefs emerge independently from their political affiliations. Our analysis is thus the first to apply DNA
to provide empirical evidence of the convergence across Italian policymakers and the potential for the bridging of political
discourses on climate change.
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1. Introduction
The first two decades of the 21st century have seen
national governments become increasingly concerned
with climate change issues (Pearce, Brown, Nerlich, &
Koteyko, 2015). However, policymakers’ approaches to
dealing with climate change are vague (Biesbroek et al.,
2010; Keohane & Oppenheimer, 2016; Kukkonen et al.,
2018) or even reductive concerning its causes, when we
consider, for example, greenhouse gas emissions (GHG;
Dunlap & McCright, 2011). Policymakers are challenged
with political conflicts when defining international and
national strategies for addressing climate change. The
annual United Nations Conferences of the Parties (COP)
aim to reduce these conflicts at an international level.
However, their effectiveness had been limited in the
past by their intrinsic weaknesses, that is until the 2015
United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) and
the Paris Agreement, which defined collective and bind-
ing goals (Victor, 2016). This international approach in-
fluenced political debate within countries, contributing
to the definition of climate change issues and associ-
ated strategies for achieving the Paris targets (Kukkonen,
Ylä-Anttila, & Broadbent, 2017).
Previous country-level evidence suggests that cli-
mate change is a divisive topic (Kukkonen et al., 2017,
2018) and that one of the main factors influencing
policymakers’ climate change opinion is their political
affiliation (Rossen, Dunlop, & Lawrence, 2015). However,
recent studies from across Europe (France, Germany,
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the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Ireland) demonstrate
that policymakers belonging to different political groups
can share similar positions on climate change (Hess
& Renner, 2019; Little, 2017; Marcinkiewicz & Tosun,
2015). Yet, to date, there is little evidence of this hav-
ing occurred in the third-largest national economy in the
Eurozone, Italy.
Our work contributes to the discussion on the na-
ture of coalitions and their relations to political realign-
ment (Kukkonen et al., 2018). Further, this article con-
tributes to the empirical literature on climate change po-
litical debates in two ways. First, we focus on the case
of Italy, from where we have thus far no evidence on the
nature of climate change discourses across policymakers.
Second, we use a different empirical basis compared to
previous work, by analysing the exact recorded wordings
from Italian debates from within the Italian Chamber of
Deputies during the 17th Legislature (2013–2018).
2. Background
2.1. Climate Change, Policymaking and the Political
Debate
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC, 2018), our world has entered a new geo-
logical epoch, the Anthropocene. The effects of human
activities on the Earth’s Systems are unprecedentedly
significant, causing a constant increase of the GHG and
transforming the biosphere. These changes have already
produced an intensification of extreme climate events
(Diffenbaugh et al., 2017), which negatively impact hu-
man activities and ecosystems.
Since the 1980s, two main strategies have been em-
ployed by national and international organizations to
address the negative effects of climate change: mitiga-
tion (e.g., reducing GHG) and adaptation (e.g., actions
for addressing the impacts of climate change and re-
ducing vulnerability; Gupta, 2010). During the 1990s, in-
ternational and national policies initially focused their
attention on mitigation, but later it became clear that
adaptation measures were also necessary to avoid fur-
ther negative effects (IPCC, 2018). Faced with these cli-
mate change-related effects, National governments put
efforts into the creation of international treaties. In the
last decades, the annual COP have driven the interna-
tional debate on climate change; however, this strategy
has proven to be ineffective over time, since a universal
agreement has always been difficult to achieve (Victor,
2016). Nonetheless, the Paris Agreement defined during
the COP21 is considered a success by some observers
(Bang, Hovi, & Skodvin, 2016). This agreement includes
two collective goals, keeping the rise in average global
temperature below 2°C (striving to limit the increase be-
low 1.5°C) and achievingworldwide carbon neutrality be-
tween 2050 and 2100, while the strength of the agree-
ment rests on the fact that it “lets countries set their own
commitments” (Victor, 2016, p. 135).
As pointed out by Carter, Ladrech, and Little (2014)
and Kukkonen et al. (2018), international treaties influ-
ence the national policy-making process for establishing
environmental targets and strategies. Nevertheless, na-
tional policies are developed and implemented by na-
tional policymakers, whose opinions on this topic can
be divisive (Kukkonen et al., 2017). Among the differ-
ent elements that influence policymakers’ perspectives
on climate change, political ideology has a prominent
role: In Western countries, right-wing parties are more
sceptical about the existence of the climate change phe-
nomena and its impact on the environment, while the
political left is more responsive to the warnings from
the scientific world (Rossen et al., 2015). However, re-
cent studies show how the convergence of rival politi-
cal parties on climate change-related issues is increas-
ing, especially in European countries. Marcinkiewicz and
Tosun (2015) find that Polish deputies, regardless of their
political membership, do not consider climate change
as an area of political competition, hence they do not
show marked differences in their opinion on this topic.
Little (2017) illustrates that the main Irish parties pre-
sented a shared consensus on climate policies during
the 2016 elections. Consistent with these studies, Hess
and Renner (2019) find convergences concerning energy-
transition policies between conservative parties and far-
right parties in six European countries (France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK). Recent
evidence from European parliament discourses on the
politics of climate change provides further evidence for
convergence, since it suggests a low level of external
politicization, as indicated by low party group polariza-
tion, internalization of political conflict at the committee
level, and compromise-building between issue dimen-
sions (Wendler, 2019).
Political debates can be useful to understand poli-
cymakers’ behaviour, which directly influences the po-
litical process (Schmidt, 2008). These debates also al-
low for greater understanding of coalition formation
and the prevalence of certain viewpoints over others
(Leifeld & Brandenberger, 2019). Furthermore, the for-
mation of coalitions is, within their institutional frame-
works, part of the political leadership choices that in-
teract to formulate policy lines and to shape trajecto-
ries of economic development and international rela-
tions (Oppermann, Kaarbo, & Brummer, 2017). As part
of creating such policy lines, coalition formation can
shape political re-alignment dynamically, in policy cy-
cles (Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2017), and contest the
most appropriate policy process (Mukherjee & Howlett,
2015). Such dynamics of policy processes and dueling
coalitions of political actors have been explainedwith the
Advocacy Coalition Framework model of Sabatier (1991).
Relative to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, other pol-
icy frameworks that also explain coalition formation ap-
pear more simplistic, as they view policy processes as
consisting of sequential, cyclical phases or ‘stages’ of gov-
ernmental problem-solving; this has led Howlett et al.
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(2017) to reconcile the conceptual pillars of the multiple-
stage and cycle models with the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, to better model competing coalitions of in-
terests within a policy subsystem.
The role of political coalitions for the sustainability
transition has received significant attention (Haukkala,
2018; Hess, 2014). The work of Haukkala (2018) de-
scribes how the Finnish green-transition advocacy coali-
tion manages the different points of view expressed
by its groups: Different perspectives lead to different
strategies, which could affect the coalition’s structure.
By investigating the role of incumbent regime coalitions,
grassroots coalitions, and the countervailing industrial
power in the US, Hess (2014) finds that non-state ac-
tors are particularly relevant in supporting political cam-
paigns and driving political coalitions’ success. The envi-
ronmental discourse has been further studied through
the focus on discourse coalitions in the case of the
fracking debate in the UK and the US (Bomberg, 2017;
Metze & Dodge, 2016), as well as regarding the polarized
discourses around environmental conflict in Australia
(Lucas & Warman, 2018), and the construction of urban
megaprojects in Germany (Nagel & Satoh, 2019).
2.2. The Italian Context
In one of the first studies dedicated to Italian climate
change policy, Marchetti (1996, p. 299) points out that
this topic is influenced “by traditional policy styles and
the outlooks of key policymakers.” Environmental issues
have had a marginal role in Italian politics, making Italy
one of the last Western countries to enter into the en-
vironmental policy arena (Westerhoff, 2010). The first cli-
mate policy introduced by the ItalianGovernmentwas re-
lated to the ratification of theUnited Nations Framework
Convention onClimate Change in 1994; theGuidelines for
National Policies and Measures regarding the Reduction
of GHG Emissions were introduced in 1998, while the
first National Climate Change Conference was organized
by the Ministry of the Environment in 2007 (Westerhoff,
2010). Since 2010, Italy has concentrated on the imple-
mentation of national climate change adaptation strate-
gies (Pasimeni, Valente, Zurlini, & Petrosillo, 2019), but,
on the other hand, it has “not included a line of policy
oriented to enhance climate initiatives at the local level,
nor has it launched collaborative arenas where national
climate action could be discussed” (De Gregorio Hurtado
et al., 2014, p. 80).
Climate change was not the main issue in the man-
ifestos of most of the political parties represented
in the Italian Parliament (De Blasio & Sorice, 2013).
Traditionally, most of the Italian parties were not partic-
ularly environment-focused, except for the Green Party;
center-left parties have always had an industrialist cul-
ture related to their communist tradition, while center-
right parties were against climate change legislation be-
cause, in their opinion, it would favor bureaucratic di-
rigisme (Carter et al., 2014). Historically, center-right
parties have been against climate change initiatives, as
in the case of the 2008 European legislative proposal
on energy and climate change, which was contested
by the Berlusconi’s government because it would have
damaged Italian industries (Carbone, 2009). This situa-
tion has changed in recent years, as increasing coverage
of extreme natural events by national media (Pasquaré
& Oppizzi, 2012) has raised climate change aware-
ness within the Italian population (European Investment
Bank, 2019), creating a demand for concrete action
by policymakers.
Subsequently, new political parties emerged, while
traditional parties tried to reorient their political mani-
festo. The Five Star Movement was created as an anti-
establishment party in 2005, and one of its main ob-
jectives is the protection of the environment. As illus-
trated by Lanzone and Woods (2015, p. 57), this party
“emerged as a constellation of local issues galvanized
around a populist thematic of politics and political repre-
sentation being about the real people.” Its political rep-
resentatives carry out a communicative strategy where
the Movement is portrayed as the only political party
interested in the protection of the environment, with
the others being portrayed as having contributed to
environmental degradation. In reaction to these allega-
tions and to build consensus, political leaders from tradi-
tional parties re-framed their climate change positions,
pointing out the importance of this topic in the politi-
cal agenda (Biscotti & D’Amico, 2016). In particular, cen-
ter and center-left parties (which governed in the 17th
Italian Legislature 2013–2018) put effort into the prepa-
ration of COP21 (Sartori, 2016), influencing the Italian
policymaking process. Furthermore, the ratification of
the Paris Agreement and the implementation of the
National Plan for Energy and Climate (Piano Nazionale
Integrato per l’Energia e il Cima) influenced the politi-
cal debate after COP21. However, we lack empirical ev-
idence and analyses on the Italian political context in
which discourse coalitions developed regarding climate
change. Since these changes (growing interest in climate
change and the influence exerted by the COP21) strongly
influenced the Italian political arena and Italian parties,
our research question is the following: Which discourse
coalitions emerged from the political debate on climate
change in Italy?
3. Discourse Network Analysis: Methodology and Data
Discourse coalitions in the political arena depict the po-
litical alliances which form around the issues under de-
bate (Fisher, Leifeld, & Iwaki, 2013), since, as pointed
out by Leifeld and Haunss (2012, p. 383), “discourses
precondition political action.” Discourse network analy-
sis (DNA) is a method that facilitates the examination
and the visualization of these coalitions by integrating
qualitative Content Analysis and quantitative tools de-
rived from Social Network Analysis (Fisher et al., 2013;
Fisher & Leifeld, 2019; Leifeld, 2017). It allows the ac-
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tors involved in political debates and the coalitions cre-
ated around specific issues to be mapped and it can be
employed to analyse any type of political issue, such
as agricultural (Ghinoi, Wesz, & Piras, 2018), environ-
mental (Fisher et al., 2013; Kukkonen et al., 2017), food
(Fergie, Leifeld, Hawkins, & Hilton, 2019), immigration
(Wallaschek, 2019), and property rights issues (Leifeld &
Haunss, 2012).
DNA is applied to statements made by the actors op-
erating in the context object of analysis. A statement
is “a text portion where an actor reveals his or her pol-
icy beliefs or preferences in the text” (Fisher & Leifeld,
2019, p. 475) on a certain concept. Therefore, actors,
concepts, and the agreement relationship between ac-
tors and concepts are the fundamental elements of the
analysis. There are two types of discourse networks: two-
mode and one-mode networks. The former includes two
types of nodes, actors and concepts: An actor is linked
to a concept if they have expressed a statement about
it, and the links (i.e., network ties) can have a positive
characterization (if the actor agrees on that concept) or
a negative characterization (if the actor does not agree
on it). One-mode networks are made by actors, where
two actors are linked if they both express a statement on
the same concept; the more they make statements on
multiple concepts, the thicker the network tie between
such actors becomes. Two aggregationmethods are used
to create one-mode networks: one based on congruence,
where a tie is established if two actors both agree on a
concept or if they both do not agree; and another based
on the presence of conflict, where a tie is established if
one actor agrees on a concept and another actor does
not agree (Leifeld, 2017). In our work, statements were
collected from the verbatim reports of the Chamber of
Deputies proceedings for the 17th Italian parliamentary
term (2013–2018), which are available online (around
900 verbatim reports are available on the website of the
Chamber of Deputies). During that period, Italy had three
different Governments supported by a coalition of cen-
ter and center-left parties (with three Prime Ministers:
Enrico Letta, 2013–2014; Matteo Renzi, 2014–2016; and
Paolo Gentiloni, 2016–2018).
Since climate change is amultifaceted issue (Wendler,
2019) that entails a broad variety of challenges and po-
tential solutions for mitigation or adaptation, our data
collection does not merely focus on who expresses a
statement on the existence of climate change, but also
on which solutions are proposed to mitigate its effects,
or why certain strategies should (or should not) be im-
plemented. We use the existing literature to reference
and classify climate change strategies into five main cat-
egories: agriculture; energy; industry, innovation, and
economy; land planning and management; and migra-
tion (Table 1). As illustrated in the IPCC report (2018), agri-
culture is particularly sensitive to climate change and a
number of strategies can be developed to reduce GHG
and adapting to climate change. In particular, the IPCC
focuses on increasing food security, providing education
to farmers, and supporting the adoption of Genetically
ModifiedOrganisms (GMOs), i.e., solutions related to the
innovativeness of the agricultural sector. In addition to
these strategies, policymakers are also focused on strate-
gies for supporting (or not) the livestock sector in order
to reduce its emissions (Gerber et al., 2013b). The energy
sector directly impacts the volume of emissions and it is
strictly related to climate change. According to the IPCC
report (2018), several energy strategies influence, posi-
tively or negatively, the production of GHG: coal extrac-
tion; support of renewable energies; oil and gas drilling;
production and use of nuclear energy; carbon capture
and storage. In order to reduce GHG, energy efficiency
should be increased and awastemanagement system for
producing energy from composting waste must be imple-
mented (Biala, 2011; IPCC, 2018); moreover, regarding
wastemanagement, another issue concerns the develop-
ment of incinerators and their impact in terms of GHG
(European Commission, 2001). Industrial and economic
strategies for challenging climate change are particularly
extensive. The UN (2015) support economic strategies
which aim to introduce pollution taxes and reduce tax
advantages for polluting companies, thus promoting the
green economy and green jobs, and supporting techno-
logical innovation for sustainability. The IPCC (2018) rec-
ommends strengthening the public transport system and
investing in the formation of sustainability professionals
for business activities. In addition to the proposals of in-
ternational organizations, neweconomic paradigms have
arisen in recent decades: the degrowth paradigm and the
circular economy paradigm. The former (Latouche, 2010)
introduces the idea that infinite growth is un-realistic and
un-sustainable, therefore degrowth is necessary to re-
duce GHG and tackle climate change. The latter is based
on the 3R’s concept (reduce, reuse, and recycle) and
the design of business strategies to close resource loops
and lower the impact of human activities on the envi-
ronment (Circle Economy, 2019). Finally, the IPCC report
(2018) highlights that those communities dependent on
agriculture will be negatively influenced by the global
temperature rise, which will increase migration flows
from Southern countries and vulnerable areas, and the
International Organization for Migration (2008) points
out the importance of distinguishing between refugees,
migrants, climate refugees, and climate migrants. This
issue is particularly relevant in the Italian context: Italy
is the first country of arrival (together with Greece and
Spain) for individuals coming from the Middle East and
African countries (Locchi, 2014), therefore it needs a
strategy for handling migrants and refugees.
Since the Paris Agreement was discussed and rati-
fied by the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 19th of
October, 2016, the time window of our analysis is based
around this date.We analyzed the political debates by fo-
cusing on twodiscourse networks, pre- and post-October
2016, in order to distinguish between those which oc-
curred before the ratification and those which occurred
since then as we assume that deputies modified their ex-
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pectations (in terms of environmental targets to pursue)
before and after that event. The data coding andmanage-
mentwas carried out via the Discourse Network Analyzer
software (Leifeld, 2010). For network visualization and
analysis, we use Ucinet (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman,
2002) and the visone software. Once uploaded the ver-
batim reports, the text parts dedicated to climate change
were extrapolated by using the following keywords: ‘cli-
mate change’ (in English), ‘climate’ (in English), ‘clima’ (in
Italian), ‘cambiamento climatico’ (in Italian), and ‘cam-
biamenti climatici’ (in Italian). Then, the policy beliefs
of the members of the Chamber of Deputies appearing
in the selected text parts were manually coded. In to-
tal, we mapped 121 deputies (out of 630) who made at
least one statement on a climate change-related strat-
egy. From the verbatim reports, we retained 348 state-
ments that: 1) Encompassed the relevant keywords; and
2) were coherent with the strategies illustrated in Table 1.
Most of these statements (around 80%) were dedicated
to the discussion of one single strategy, while the 6%
was dedicated to the discussion of three or more strate-
gies. The most debated strategies were those focused
on land planning and management, renewable energies,
and oil drilling activities. Following Fisher and Leifeld
(2019), statements pre- and post-October 2016were first
transformed into actor-by-strategy matrices, which are
the equivalent of two-mode networks, where a tie has a
positive characterization when a deputy agrees on a cer-
tain strategy (e.g., if a deputy supports oil drilling activi-
ties) and a negative characterization otherwise (e.g., if a
deputy does not support oil drilling activities). Duplicate
statements were ignored in the matrix creation. Then,
the two-mode networks were converted into one-mode
networks, by using the congruence network approach
and the conflict network approach (Leifeld, 2017). Using
the congruence network approach, deputies with simi-
lar beliefs on a certain strategy, both in a positive in a
negative way, are linked together with edges that are
proportionally weighted to the number of shared beliefs;
with the conflict network approach, deputies are linked
if they have an opposite view on a certain strategy. In
the creation of these networks, we used the normaliza-
tion method of the edge weights illustrated by Leifeld
(2017), in order to remove potential problems due to
core-periphery structures. Moreover, we also created
additional networks where ‘weak’ edges (edges with a
Table 1. Strategies related to climate change.
Strategy ID Strategy Category Reference
FOOD Increase food security
Agriculture
IPCC (2018)
FARM_EDU Provide specific education to farmers IPCC (2018)
LIVESTOCK Support the livestock sector Gerber et al. (2013b)
GMO Support GMO production IPCC (2019)
COAL Support coal extraction
Energy
IPCC (2018)
INCINE Developing incinerators European Commission (2001)
COMPOST Support composting waste Biala (2011)
EN_EFF Increase energy efficiency IPCC (2018)
EN_RENEW Support renewable energies IPCC (2018)
OIL_DRI Support oil drilling activities IPCC (2018)
GAS_DRI Support gas drilling activities IPCC (2018)
NUCLEAR Production and use of nuclear energy IPCC (2018)
CARB_CAPT Support carbon capture and storage IPCC (2018)
DEGROWTH Transition to degrowth
Industry and economy
Latouche (2010)
POLL_TAX Introduction of a pollution tax (tassa di scopo) UN (2015)
GREEN_ECO Promoting green economy UN (2015)
(e.g., increasing green jobs)
INNO_SUST Support technological innovation UN (2015)
for sustainability
TRANSPORT Support public transports IPCC (2018)
CIRCULAR Transition to circular economy Circle Economy (2019)
(reduce, reuse, and recycle)
PROF_EDU Training sustainability professionals IPCC (2018)
TAX_ADV Reduce tax advantages for polluting companies UN (2015)
LAND Reducing land consumption; Land planning and IPCC (1991)
management of parks, forests, and coastal areas management
ECO_MIG Legal recognition of eco-migrants Migration International Organization
for Migration (2008)
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normalized weight below 50%) were removed and the
Louvain method for community detection was applied
to detect hyperplanes according to cluster memberships
(i.e., groups of deputies sharingmultiple policy beliefs, in
the case of congruence networks, or strong conflicts, in
the case of the conflict networks).
4. Results and Discussion
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results,
each political party was attributed to a specific politi-
cal position, adopting the classical ‘left–right’ dichotomy.
Table 2 illustrates the number of statements expressed
by the deputies on climate change, grouped by politi-
cal party and period of observation. The deputies of the
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) and the Five Star
Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) were prevailing in the
climate change debate, covering almost 50% of the re-
lated statements expressed during the Legislature. In par-
ticular, two deputies from the Five Star Movement were
highly involved in the debate, namely Mirko Busto and
Massimo Felice De Rosa (Table 3), who expressed around
15% of the total mapped statements.
Figures 1 and 2 show the two-mode networks, with
deputies represented by circles of different colors (ex-
pressing their political affiliation) and strategies repre-
sented by pink squares. Green ties indicate positive state-
ments, while red ties refer to negative statements. As il-
lustrated by these figures, deputies concur on several
strategies. They strongly agree on the support for renew-
able energies (EN_RENEW) and the introduction of novel
approaches to land management (LAND). The produc-
tion of energy from renewable sources has exponentially
increased in Italy in recent decades (Legambiente, 2015),
and Italian politicians seem to recognize the positive ef-
fects of supporting renewables in economic and environ-
mental terms. On the other hand, Italy has a history of
abandoning its internal and peripheral areas in favor of
urbanized areas (Carrosio, 2019), which has therefore led
to greater exposure to extremeevents (Istituto Superiore
per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale, 2018), caus-
ing damage and incidents which have attracted public at-
tention. However, a group of right and center–right wing
deputies are against the idea of degrowth (DEGROWTH)
and generally oppose any economic approach that could
harm Italian firms. This strategy was also debated be-
fore the ratification of the Paris Agreement when the
possibility of new legal restrictions was of concern to
the manufacturing sector; after the Paris ratification,
it was no longer discussed in the Legislature. Another
group, mainly composed of left and center–left wing
deputies and deputies from the Five Star Movement,
jointly oppose GMO deployment and are advocates for
traditional/biological farming methods (GMO). Since the
agri-food sector is particularly important to the Italian
economy, this strategy takes a lot of space in the public
debate, which is divided between the negative opinions
regarding GMOs espoused by the main national associ-
ation of Italian farmers (Coldiretti) and the positive as-
sessment of the scientific community (Pellegrino, Bedini,
Nuti, & Ercoli, 2018). However, the former seems to pre-
vail in the Italian Chamber of Deputies.
Table 2. Participation in climate change debates: Number of statements by political party.
Statements Statements
pre-October 2016 post-October 2016
Political party Political position N° % N° %
Alternativa Libera-Possibile Left 7 2.5 2 3.1
Articolo 1—Movimento Democratico e Progressista Left 1 0.4 5 7.7
Sinistra Ecologia Libertà Left 62 21.9 6 9.2
Democrazia Solidale—Centro Democratico Centre-left 7 2.5 1 1.5
Partito Democratico Centre-left 73 25.8 14 21.5
Partito Socialista Italiano—Liberali per l’Italia Centre-left 5 1.8 1 1.5
—Indipendenti
Alternativa Popolare—Centristi per l’Europa—NCD Centre 13 4.6 0 0.0
Civici e Innovatori Centre 7 2.5 2 3.1
Misto—Minoranze linguistiche Centre 1 0.4 0 0.0
Misto—Nessuna componente Centre 2 0.7 1 1.5
Scelta Civica per l’Italia Centre 2 0.7 3 4.6
Movimento 5 Stelle Protest party 62 21.9 18 27.7
Alleanza Liberalpopolare—Autonomie Centre–right 2 0.7 0 0.0
Forza Italia—Il Popolo della Libertà Centre–right 12 4.2 3 4.6
Fratelli d’Italia—Alleanza Nazionale Right 2 0.7 3 4.6
Lega Nord Right 20 7.1 1 1.5
Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies No political position 5 1.8 5 7.7
Total 283 100.0 65 100.0
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Table 3. Ten most active deputies on climate change debates.
Statements
Deputy Political party Political position pre-October 2016 (N°)
Mirko Busto Movimento 5 Stelle Protest party 20
Stella Bianchi Partito Democratico Centre–left 20
Serena Pellegrino Sinistra Ecologia Libertà Left 17
Massimo Felice De Rosa Movimento 5 Stelle Protest party 15
Filiberto Zaratti Sinistra Ecologia Libertà Left 14
Chiara Braga Partito Democratico Centre-left 9
Adriano Zaccagnini Sinistra Ecologia Libertà Left 8
Susanna Cenni Partito Democratico Centre–left 8
Samuele Segoni Alternativa Libera-Possibile Left 7
Salvatore Matarrese Civici e Innovatori Centre 6
Statements
Deputy Political party Political position post-October 2016 (N°)
Mirko Busto Movimento 5 Stelle Protest party 7
Enrico Borghi Partito Democratico Centre–left 5
Massimo Felice De Rosa Movimento 5 Stelle Protest party 3
Serena Pellegrino Sinistra Ecologia Libertà Left 3
Adriano Zaccagnini Sinistra Ecologia Libertà Left 2
Ermete Realacci Partito Democratico Centre-left 2
Gian Luca Galletti Goverment 2
Monica Faenzi Alleanza Liberalpopolare—Autonomie Centre–right 2
Samuele Segoni Alternativa Libera-Possibile Left 2
Walter Rizzetto Fratelli d’Italia—Alleanza Nazionale Right 2
Two strategies emerge as highly divisive: the support
for oil drilling activities (OIL_DRI) and the legal recogni-
tion of eco-migrants (ECO_MIG).While the first concerns
the opposition of left-wing deputies and deputies from
the Five StarMovement to the energy policy of the Italian
Government, which envisaged the exploration of new oil
deposits for reducing Italy’s dependence on imported en-
ergy supplies, the latter is mainly a left-wing/right-wing
Figure 1. Pre-October 2016 two-mode network. Notes: Pink squares = debated strategies; red circles = left parties’
deputies; orange circles = center–left parties’ deputies; white circles = center parties’ deputies; yellow circles = protest
parties’ deputies; blue circles = center–right parties’ deputies; black circles = right parties’ deputies; grey circles =mem-
bers of the Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. Green ties indicate that policymakers agree on certain
strategies; red ties indicate their disagreement.
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Figure 2. Post-October 2016 two-mode network. Notes: Pink squares = debated strategies; red circles = left parties’
deputies; orange circles = center–left parties’ deputies; white circles = center parties’ deputies; yellow circles = protest
parties’ deputies; blue circles = center–right parties’ deputies; black circles = right parties’ deputies; grey circles =mem-
bers of the Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. Green ties indicate that policymakers agree on certain
strategies; red ties indicate their disagreement.
conflict. Yet, this is probably the only strategy where
there is a clear distinction between the two opposing
sides of the political arena, which are unable to find a
solution for this issue.
Figures 3–6 show the one-mode networks that were
created from the two-mode networks (Figures 1 and 2).
These figures illustrate more clearly the presence of dis-
course coalitions and conflict between Italian deputies.
In the pre-ratification period of the Paris Agreement
(Figures 3 and 5), a central cloud of policymakers
emerged who shared several policy beliefs, from differ-
ent political parties, in the congruence network; how-
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Pre-October 2016 congruent one-mode networks. (a) Total. (b) Threshold+hyperplanes. Notes: Red circles = left
parties’ deputies; orange circles = center–left parties’ deputies; white circles = center parties’ deputies; yellow cir-
cles = protest parties’ deputies; blue circles = center–right parties’ deputies; black circles = right parties’ deputies; grey
circles =members of the Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4. Post-October 2016 congruent one-mode networks. (a) Total. (b) Threshold+hyperplanes. Notes: Red circles= left
parties’ deputies; orange circles = center–left parties’ deputies; white circles = center parties’ deputies; yellow cir-
cles = protest parties’ deputies; blue circles = center–right parties’ deputies; black circles = right parties’ deputies; grey
circles =members of the Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.
ever, by looking at Figure 3b, deputies from the center–
left parties (orange nodes) are predominant in this cloud,
sharing strong linkages. The conflict network (Figure 5)
shows that disputes arise from deputies with different
political positions, as expected; there is only one excep-
tion, a deputy from a center–left party that does not
agree on a strategy supported by colleagues (see the
top left hyperplane in Figure 5b). However, it is inter-
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Pre-October 2016 conflict one-mode networks. (a) Total. (b) Threshold+hyperplanes. Notes: Red circles = left
parties’ deputies; orange circles = center–left parties’ deputies; white circles = center parties’ deputies; yellow cir-
cles = protest parties’ deputies; blue circles = center–right parties’ deputies; black circles = right parties’ deputies; grey
circles =members of the Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6. Post-October 2016 conflict one-mode networks. (a) Total. (b) Threshold+hyperplanes. Notes: Red circles = left
parties’ deputies; orange circles = center–left parties’ deputies; white circles = center parties’ deputies; yellow cir-
cles = protest parties’ deputies; blue circles = center–right parties’ deputies; black circles = right parties’ deputies; grey
circles =members of the Government/Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.
esting to note that the Five Star Movement is always in-
volved in emerging conflicts, trying to legitimate its role
as a protest party. Regarding the post-ratification period
(Figures 4 and 6), networks appear much polarized. In
the congruence network (Figure 4), the classical ‘left–
right’ dichotomy is more pronounced, while the Five
Star Movement loses its protesting nature: in particular,
deputies from center–right and right parties support cer-
tain strategies,which are not discussedbyother deputies
(supporting the livestock sector, LIVESTOCK; see Figure 2)
or even contrasted by center–left and left parties (the
eco-migrants issue, ECO_MIG; see Figure 2). Indeed, this
conflict on the legal recognition of eco-migrants is pretty
much evident in Figure 6, as it is the only strategy
where left/center–left and right/center–right parties do
not strongly agree. Coalitions arising from congruence
networks can be analyzed according to the political ho-
mophily literature. Political homophily occurs when ac-
tors with similar political characteristics express similar
policy beliefs (Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013a). The ho-
mophily between political groups (in our case, political
parties sharing the same political position; see Table 2) is
measured using the Krackhardt and Stern’s (1988) E-I in-
dex, which allows one to understand if a group is more
externally or internally oriented, in terms of their shared
beliefs. This index ranges between−1 and 1: Scores close
to −1 indicate that deputies agree only with those who
share the same political position; scores close to 0 show
that deputies share similar beliefs equally with those
who have the same political position and those who
do not; scores close to 1 suggest a tendency to share
policy beliefs with deputies who have different politi-
cal positions. We estimate the E-I index by focusing on
the congruence networks pre- and post-October 2016
(Table 4); we do not concentrate on the conflict net-
works because deputies with similar political positions
rarely disagree with one another (except for the center–
left deputy discussed above; see Figure 5b), i.e., the
E-I index would have been biased. In general, we do not
detect high levels of political homophily, since E-I indexes
Table 4. E-I index.
Political position E-I index pre-October 2016 E-I index post-October 2016
Left 0.619 0.662
Centre–left 0.260 0.696
Centre 0.762 0.862
Protest party 0.530 0.284
Centre–right 0.852 0.333
Right 0.708 0.833
No political position 0.826 0.897
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are often in between 0.500 and 1, which means that
deputies share similar policy beliefs with thosewho have
different political positions. In the pre-October 2016 pe-
riod, the center–right group shows the higher E-I index
while the center–left group has an index close to zero.
After the ratification of the Paris Agreement, the center–
right group’s index dropped to 0.333, while almost all
other groups increased their indexes, which indicates
that Italian parties had become more collaborative dur-
ing this period. Moreover, the E-I indexes showed by
the Five Star Movement (protest party) indicate that this
party was not totally open to supporting the strategies
shared by other parties, nor was it totally withdrawn, de-
spite its conflict over several topics with others.
These results suggest that members of the center–
left governing parties (Partito Democratico, Partito
Socialista Italiano—Liberali per l’Italia—Indipendenti,
Democrazia Solidale—Centro Democratico, and other
parties who supported the three Governments of the
Legislature) formed a more cohesive group during the
period before the Paris Agreement ratification. In con-
trast, theMovimento 5 Stelle alternated between having
shared policy beliefs and strong political conflict with the
other parties.
5. Conclusions
This work contributes to the growing body of knowledge
on climate change policymaking, providing empirical ev-
idence on the Italian case study. It applies DNA to in-
vestigate the political debate on climate change by the
Italian Chamber of Deputies. Our analysis suggests that,
consistent with previous studies on European countries
(e.g., Hess & Renner, 2019; Little, 2017; Marcinkiewicz &
Tosun, 2015), climate change is an issue where rival po-
litical parties can have convergent policy beliefs. This is
reflected also in the declarations expressed by the Italian
deputies: most of them have stated their total support to
the Paris Agreement, with only the deputies of the Lega
Nord party abstaining from the final vote.
However, some divisive strategies were identified
among political parties related to climate change. Since
Italian policymakers generally accept the evidence of cli-
mate change (only one deputy has denied the existence
of a correlation between human activities and climate
change: Paolo Tancredi, from Alternativa Popolare—
Centristi per l’Europa—NCD), situations of conflict arise
when the debate focuses on the strategies to cope with
this problem. Deputies from the left and center–left par-
ties and the Five Star Movement were predominant in
the political debate, creating persistent coalitions over
time around certain core strategies that were also sup-
ported by other policymakers (e.g., reduction of land
consumption and management of green areas, and sup-
port for renewable energies). However, despite the ab-
sence of strong conflicts, a small-scale polarization is vis-
ible in the Italian political arena, which is more evident
when the debate switches to sensitive topics such as im-
migration and the economy (for example, oil drilling ac-
tivities). Shifting to a more pro-active attitude towards
climate change adaptation actions has fostered new de-
bates in Italy, modifying the positioning of policymakers
and supporting the creation of both new alliances and di-
visions according to the topic. This polarized debate that
we identified with DNA in the case of oil drilling could
not only be related to previous case study evidence from
Australia on polarized discourses around environmental
conflict (Lucas & Warman, 2018) but also to the applica-
tion of discourse analysis to distinguish between compet-
ing coalitions and their shared narratives in the UK frack-
ing debate (Bomberg, 2017), as well as to the application
of discursive boundary work to study the dynamics of
discourse coalitions in the US fracking debate (Metze &
Dodge, 2016).
In sum, our study’s empirical contribution is thus
to employ DNA to the Italian climate change political
debate, highlighting that political conflicts are driven
by political strategies to cope with climate change.
Furthermore, the complexities that we have empirically
identified as part of this debate (including the concur-
rence on distinct strategies) suggest that a conceptual
simplification of viewing the environmental policy pro-
cesses as consisting of sequential or cyclical phases of
governmental problem-solving (e.g., Burton, 2006) is
probably less appropriate, in line with Howlett et al.’s
(2017) call for more complex conceptual models that en-
able us to better understand competing coalitions of in-
terests within a policy subsystem.
Nevertheless, this study faces two main limitations.
First, we have no information on the Senators’ state-
ments. The Italian Parliament consists of the Chamber
of Deputies and the Senate, but the verbatim reports
from the senators include collective statements. There-
fore, we could not distinguish which senator had pro-
nounced a specific policy belief, while assigning one pol-
icy belief to multiple senators could bias the analysis.
Second, we were not able to investigate the linkage be-
tween deputies’ statements and the actual implemen-
tation of climate change-related strategies. Further ana-
lysis should be dedicated to investigating the influence
of environmental advocacy coalitions for implementing
dedicated policies.
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